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1. Introduction
When I was invited by Hans Hansen to comment on Chris Tindale’s book on The Philosophy of
Argument and Audience Reception, I thought the best thing I could possibly do with respect to a
book on that subject was to assume the role of a typical audience. So before I even opened the
book, I pondered about what sort of contents I might reasonably expect. All I had to go on at that
moment was what I could read on the book’s cover, what I could infer from this, what I
remembered from earlier books by and various talks with Chris, and the testimony given on it by
other people. In other words I tried to fathom what my personal cognitive environment would yield
as information.
I anticipated that I would certainly find something on Aristotle, who defines oratorical
genres by their respective audiences – clearly a hit as it turned out; and also on Perelman and his
notion of a universal audience – another hit. I also expected to learn more about the pragmadialectical idea of strategic maneuvering by adapting to audience demand – an expectation I did
find fulfilled, yet less so than I had anticipated, and only at a fairly late moment within the book.
What may have been the reason for this? It wouldn’t be bias, would it? Knowing Chris, I further
anticipated some words about cognitive environments – an expectation that was not disappointed
either.
The first thing I discovered, however, was that, without further information, it was not even
clear how precisely the book’s title was to be read. Was “philosophy” to be taken as distributed
over the two other terms or not? Were we to understand that the book was about (a) the philosophy
of argument, and (b) audience reception; or rather about the philosophy of (a) argument and (b)
audience reception? After some reflection, based on what I knew about Chris being a philosopher,
I decided that ‘philosophy’ must be the overarching theme. And indeed, this is a deeply
philosophical book, much more so than a book on argumentation only, since its range goes far
beyond that. But this assumption was so far merely based on my previous knowledge and
experience.
I also knew that there must have been some stimulus for Chris to write that book. Yet how
could I have known what this stimulus might have been? Chris might have felt the urge to let the
scholarly community know more about his ideas on the role of the audience in argumentation. He
might have wished to spur some new discussion among argumentation theorists. Or he might just
have intended to satisfy his own curiosity with respect to this field of research. Certainly I never
thought of imputing to Chris any other than the most noble and most sincere motives, but this again
was entirely based on my very personal assessment of Chris’s character that had accrued from

acquaintance over time and had been buttressed by my knowledge of his earlier writings and by
other people’s testimony.
What I have learned from this experiment is that the meaning and intention an author gives
to his or her text is not simply transferred from the sender to the recipient, but has to be
(re)constructed by each recipient on the basis of the text itself and of knowledge accumulated over
time on the subject matter and on the character and value judgments of the sender. The same, if
we believe Chris, is true for the communication of arguments.
2. Structure and overall argument of the book
As was to be expected from an author so thoroughly imbued with rhetorical principles, the book
is very clearly structured. After two introductory chapters that set the stage for what is to come
and already address all relevant topics, there follow three ‘historical’ chapters (ch. 3-5), in which
three classical concepts of audience-oriented argumentation analysis are examined: those of
Aristotle, of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, and of Jürgen Habermas. These are
followed by four theoretical chapters (ch. 6-9) on meaning, testimony, emotions and agency,
before in the final three chapters (ch. 10-12) these concepts are more specifically applied to the
domain of argumentation.
While within the model of argumentative communication the factors of message and
speaker have mainly been in the focus of interest, the audience as the third element has hitherto
been underrated, when, according to Chris, it should rather be regarded as the decisive factor.
Chris very elegantly opens his book with a comparison of three different speeches by
Barack Obama (pp. 3-12), each of which can be attributed to one of the classical genres of oratory:
his candidacy speech in Springfield, Illinois in February 2007 as an example of deliberative
oratory; his victory speech as president-elect in Chicago in November 2008, which may perhaps
be called judicial (even if not in the most literal of senses); and his memorial speech for Edward
Kennedy in August 2009 as an example of the epideictic genre. In all three speeches, Chris
highlights the role of values as a basis for persuasion, which will become important later in the
book, especially with respect to Perelman and his identification of the value-centred epideictic
genre as the most important of all.
As I read through the book, I realized that what I found to be its most central term was not
even mentioned in its title; and this term is “social”. Chris interprets argumentation as an
essentially and predominantly social phenomenon, in which speaker and audience must cooperate
in a highly complex manner to create meaning and sense and to achieve successful communication
and argumentative progress. It is by virtue of our being social beings that we are argumentative
beings.
In that sense Chris understands good arguments as invitational utterances, as invitations
directed at an audience to engage in a process of interpretation of what has been said. Argument
validity in that sense is not to be assessed in terms of logical, let alone formally logical validity,
but in terms of ascriptions of epistemic, personal, and social values by the audience, supported
also by what Paul Thagard (2000; 2006) calls “emotional valences”, in which components so
typically rhetorical as the speaker’s ethos, personal trust and emotional attachments of pathos
come into play (pp. 148-165; 218-222).
Some of the chapters are so densely written and deal with so intricate philosophical
problems that I had to reread a fair number of passages several times until I could be quite sure
that I had understood their intention. But this will again vary from reader to reader, depending on

individual backgrounds. In my case, while I found the chapters on testimony (pp. 127-147) and
emotions (pp. 148-166) a fairly easy read, in the first case because I had heard Chris lecture on
this topic earlier, and in the latter because this is also my personal domain of interest as a
rhetorician, among the most demanding chapters for me, however, was the one on ‘Meaning and
reasons’ (pp. 99-126), in which Chris starts from Paul Grice’s cooperative principle and
corresponding maxims, and his concept of implicatures, which both require the audience’s
cooperation (Grice 1989; 2001), but even so still see meaning as dependent on the speaker’s
intentions. Chris therefore prefers to turn to Robert Brandom’s theory of ‘normative pragmatics’
(Brandom 1994; 2000) that explains the meaning of utterances in terms of ‘commitments’ that a
speaker makes in uttering arguments, for which she can also be held responsible by the audience.
It is clearly Brandom’s views that become increasingly appealing to Chris in the course of the
book. Brandom’s theory of normative pragmatics has been adopted by other argumentation
scholars before, such as Fred Kauffeld (1986; 1995; 1998), Scott Jacobs (1998; 2000), Jean
Goodwin (2000; 2002; 2011), and Beth Innocenti (2006; 2011; Goodwin and Innocenti
forthcoming 2016), and the term itself has been introduced earlier and independently in a pragmadialectical context by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootensdorst (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
1984: p. 18; 2004: pp. 9-11; van Eemeren 1990: p. 38)), but Chris’s rhetorical exploitation in terms
of audience response seems to me to be the most far-reaching.
Yet Brandom’s theory also implies that mutual comprehension of interlocutors in an
argumentative discussion and hence successful communication becomes virtually unexplainable,
since, because as a matter of principle the speaker’s intentions are not preserved in the
communication process, the latter process entirely depends on the audience attributing the right
commitments to the speaker, which is difficult in view of the incommensurability of the personal
belief sets of individual persons. In that context it is surprising that Chris, who is also the author
of an important book on the Greek sophists (2010), does not mention here the intellectual ancestor
of such a view, namely Gorgias of Leontini, who held that human communication on reality was
impossible, owing to the differences of personal opinions, which entails that no two persons, and
not even the same person at different times, will hold the same opinion on the same thing (Frg. 82
B 3, 83-86 DK; see Tindale 2010: pp. 88 and 106-107). Even the one exception, by which Brandom
salvages an objective view, namely the commonality of the res addressed in so-called ascriptions
de re, seems to have been anticipated by Gorgias, since in one fragment the Sicilian sophist appears
to be saying that the only situation in which two interlocutors may share the same view on the
same object is when the object in question is visibly present to both of them at the same time (Frg.
B 3, 85 DK).
Another particularly rhetorical problem that, I think, is important and that Chris addresses
under various perspectives in several chapters is the problem of multiple audiences. This problem
has two sides to it: It may refer to different situations, such as when a speaker speaks to his or her
own self in private deliberation, or to an opponent in a dialectical situation, or to a broader
audience. This comes to the fore in Perelman’s distinction of the three different audiences (p. 58)
as well as in Grice’s reflections on the special cases of absent audiences, such as in silent thinking
or other cases of soliloquizing (pp. 107-109). In another sense, the problem also concerns the case
of composite audiences, especially so in present-day situations of speakers confronted with huge,
remote, heterogeneous, amorphous and non-interactive audiences, which causes severe problems
for a speaker’s assessment of her audience and her adaptation to it, and has made Trudy Govier
(1999, pp. 196-197) express her general scepticism about the prospects of an appeal to audiences
for resolving problems of argument evaluation and analysis (pp. 25-26; 214-215). The problem is

also raised in Perelman’s discussion of composite audiences (pp. 75-78). Chris addresses the
problem under the heading of ‘audience identity’ (pp. 24-28), and an ultimate solution for it may
have to include Perelman’s concept of the universal audience. A special problem is posed by
‘historical’ arguments and audiences, in which an arguer cannot have had knowledge of his or her
potential audiences in the remote future, and inversely we cannot know the author’s original
intended audience. Chris tackles this problem by way of an appeal to a general human standard of
reasonableness again guaranteed by the authority of a universal audience, and by the additional
concept of an ‘elective audience’, according to which we may freely choose to be recipients of any
given historical text (pp. 221; 224).
In the three final chapters of the book (pp. 181-224), Chris brings together all the concepts
that have been developed and expounded in previous chapters and applies them to the particular
situation of argumentation. In that context, however, two new concepts are introduced. First, the
concept of presence or of making an argument present in the minds of the audience, which again
brings in the active role of the speaker via the ancient concept of energeia and the modern notion
of cognitive environments (pp. 181-196); and second, the theory of reception, otherwise known
from literary criticism and from the role of the reader in the understanding of fictional literature,
here adapted to the situation of arguer and audience (pp. 197-211). But the ultimate decisive role
in the understanding of processes of argumentation appears to be attributed to two well-known
concepts that are now brought closely together: namely the Perelmanian concept of a universal
audience (pp. 216-222), and the notion of cognitive environments (pp. 222-224) that derives from
the work of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in the eighties of the last century (1986). Chris had
already invoked the latter concept in his earlier books (1999, pp. 101-115; 2004, pp. 22-23; 172176). But now he extends it to include not only cognitive, but also ethotic and emotional and,
above all, evaluative elements (which brings the book’s argument back to the Obama speeches,
from which it had taken its start). Here is what Chris has to say on this:
Throughout the discussions of this and previous chapters the gap between the
cognitive environment and the universal audience has been steadily closing, and
now is the time to effect the final assimilation that this study would support. As we
have seen in several places, the universal audience has had a history of
misunderstanding and difficult application […]. What it lacks in concreteness, we
now see, the cognitive environment provides, and little of significance is lost. (p.
223)
In other words, by merging it with the concept of universal audience, the cognitive environment is
made social, which makes it qualify as the ultimate instance of argument evaluation and appraisal.
3. Two minor points of criticism, and a question to the author
Before I come to my conclusion, I would like to address just a couple of minor points of criticism.
The first one concerns Chris’s report of Aristotle’s account of the rhetorical syllogism, or
the enthymeme (pp. 46-50). As is well known, Aristotle defines the enthymeme as the rhetorical
variety of a deductive argument, and divides it into two categories: enthymemes from likelihoods
and enthymemes from signs. The difference between both is obvious: whereas enthymemes from
likelihoods are based on a valid deductive inference, but their premises are only probable or
commonly accepted (endoxa), enthymemes from signs rest on true or proven premises, but their

inference schemes are invalid (except for the special case of the so-called tekmerion, the necessary
or irrefutable enthymeme). They are refutable, but reputable.
In Prior Analytics II 27, Aristotle gives a syllogistic explanation of the different kinds of
enthymemes from signs, based on the three figures of the syllogism. Based on James Allen’s book
on Inference from Signs (2001), Chris proceeds from the Analytics’ understanding and repeatedly
states that this was then “carried through into the Rhetoric” (p. 46). This, however, appears to
sidestep an important recent discussion that has been going on in Aristotelian scholarship during
the last fifteen years. For it is very clear that the Rhetoric was originally composed long before the
Analytics were conceived and hence before Aristotle developed the theory of the categorical
syllogism in its three figures. Hence the apparent parallels in the account of the enthymeme
between the Prior Analytics and book I of the Rhetoric represent an irritating phenomenon. The
classical solution, propounded by Solmsen (1929: pp. 13-27) and repeated by Burnyeat (1994: pp.
31-38) has been to assume that these were later intrusions within the Rhetoric inserted at some
later moment, after the categorical syllogism had been developed. Contrary to this view, in his
magisterial two-volume commentary on the Rhetoric, printed in 2002, the German philosopher
Christof Rapp has made a strong point in favour of the view that the account of the enthymeme as
we find it in book I of the Rhetoric can and must be interpreted exclusively on the basis of the
topical syllogism as expounded in Aristotle’s Topics (and described accordingly in book II of the
Rhetoric), and that any association with analytical concepts should be shunned (Rapp 2002, vol.
2, pp. 241–248; see also Rapp 2005). He has meanwhile convinced a majority of Aristotle scholars
of his view; but the discussion has been going on ever since, and one of the projects I am currently
working on myself is the development of an integrative theory on which the account of the
enthymeme in the Rhetoric can be interpreted on an entirely topical basis, and yet nonetheless the
strange parallels in examples between Rhetoric and Analytics can be explained. I cannot go into
more detail, but all I wish to suggest is that in the present state of the discussion it might be safer
not to claim that anything has been carried over into the Rhetoric from the Analytics, although this
does not in any way impair the validity of Chris’s general thoughts.
My second point is rather just a puzzlement or a suggestion. Considering the pivotal
importance of the concept of cognitive environments for Chris’s general theory, I was surprised to
find that he had not in that respect invoked Petty and Cacioppo’s cognitive response analysis of
attitude changes by argumentative persuasion (Petty 1977; Cacioppo, Harkins and Petty 1981;
Petty, Wells, Heesacker, Brock and Cacioppo 1983; Petty and Cacioppo 1984; 1986b), nor the
corresponding Elaboration Likelihood Model of argument impact (Petty and Cacioppo 1986a;
Petty and Wegener 1999). Adducing this model would have further emphasized the role of the
audience in the process of persuasion, since it describes how persuasion happens entirely within
the minds of the audience, who eventually persuade themselves. In distinguishing between a
central and peripheral route of persuasion, the model would also have provided ample occasion to
incorporate ethotic and pathetic elements into the description.
If I may finally raise one question of clarification, this would be about the book’s very
peculiar way in which it relates persuasion and conviction to one another. Contrary to what one
would expect, Chris prefers to assume that “persuasion builds on conviction rather than aiming to
produce it” (p. 30). This is a surprising view one would still wish to see explained in more detail.
4. Conclusion

But apart from these minor points, Chris Tindale’s book is definitely a major achievement not only
in argumentation theory. It is a philosophical book in the best sense of the word, which will have
an impact far beyond the boundaries of argumentation theory. Its results will apply to
communication theory in general. But they will also be tremendously important for the theory of
rhetoric. The book’s comprehensive account that does not only bring audience on a par with the
speaker in rhetorical and argumentative communication, but likewise incorporates elements of
ethos and pathos into a complete theory of argument, will set new standards and will certainly
have reverberations in various domains of philosophy. What I will take up for my teaching as well
as for my research is the very special way how Chris brings various philosophical theories from
different backgrounds together to form such a comprehensive theory. Since I am currently teaching
a class on Rhetorical Elements in Contemporary Argumentation Theories, for me Chris’s book
came out at the right moment. But I think all of us owe Chris a great debt of thanks for this rich
and multifaceted book that will stimulate our future work in very many ways.
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